(3)u = u(c 1 , c 2 ,..., c I , g) Using a subscript to denote a first derivative, we assume that households receive positive marginal utility from consumption (u ci > 0), but they dislike their own contribution of garbage to the waste stream (u g < 0). Households differ with respect to their distaste for contributing garbage: a household with a large value of u g (in absolute value) dislikes contributing garbage more than a household with a low value.
Each household is endowed with k units of time (or other resources) that can be supplied to a labor market to earn a wage p k (which can vary across households), or can be used to separate and store recyclable material. Let k c denote the amount of household time supplied to the labor market, and let k r denote the time devoted by the household to the separation of recyclable materials. Therefore, we have:
(4)k = k c + k r .
The amount of time devoted to separating and storing recyclable materials is assumed to be proportional to the amount of recycling conducted by the household:
(5)k r = r.
We assume that is the same for all households and all materials (but the value of that time varies with the wage rate, p k ).<4>
With no city program to collect recyclable material, a household must pay a recycling firm directly for the transfer of the material. Denote this payment by the household as p rj per unit of material of type j that is recycled. We assume that p rj is particular to the type of material being recycled and can take on a positive or negative value. For example, the cost to the household of paying a firm to recycle toxic waste could be very high, while the household may be able to sell precious metals to a recycling firm (p rj could be negative). For used items sold on the second hand market, we interpret p rj to include advertising costs. Some materials may be collected from the curb as part of a curbside recycling program. The market price paid by households to recycle these materials is zero. A curbside recycling program represents an implicit subsidy to the household of s rj per unit of recycled material which offsets p rj such that the overall cost p rj -s rj = 0. The value of s rj is zero for all materials not collected at the curb. The value of s rj will be negative for all collected materials that have positive market value. Therefore, s rj is a tax on households if the government mandates that households produce these materials at the curb. Aluminum could be an example. A household that is not required to certain materials compares the cost of free curbside recycling pickup with the cost of sending used materials directly to secondary markets (bypassing curbside pickup). Thus our model is general enough to encompass second-hand sales.
The local government could also levy a user fee t g per unit of garbage, regardless of the type of material. This fee is the household's only out of pocket marginal cost of curbside garbage disposal. The household may pay property taxes or a monthly fee, but, in the absence of a user fee for garbage collection, the price paid at the margin per bag of garbage is zero.
Household income (p k k -p k k r ) can be used to purchase consumption goods at market prices p ci, to recycle material j at unit cost p rj, and to pay any user fee that might be levied on garbage. Therefore, the budget constraint facing the household is:
(6)?jp cici + t g g + ? j (p rj-s rj)rj = p k k -p k (r) where s rj = p rj if the recyclable material j is collected for free, and s rj is zero for all other materials not collected for recycling.
Each household chooses the amount of each consumption good, and how to dispose of the resulting material, by maximizing utility (3) subject to (1), (2), and the budget constraint (6). The relevant first order conditions from this maximization are:
where is the marginal utility of income to household i. Define * and u g* to be the values of and u g at the solution to (7). The household's choice between waste removal options for each material is governed by:
(8a) m j = g j iff t g -u g*/*< (pr j -s rj) + p k (8b) m j = r j iff t g -u g*/*> (pr j -s rj) + p k
The household compares the marginal cost of recycling material j (p rj -s rj + p k ) to the overall marginal "cost" of contributing garbage of material j --which is the money payment (t g ) plus the value of marginal utility lost from contributing a unit of garbage (u g*/*). These conditions could imply a set of corner solutions. If the marginal cost of recycling a newspaper is less than the overall marginal "cost" of discarding it, then a household would be expected to recycle all of its newspaper, not just some portion of it.<5>
The household could choose an interior solution for a material j in which it discards some portion (g j ) and recycles some portion (r j ) of the material, if t g -u g*/* = (pr j -s rj) + p k . This equality will hold only for very few materials at the knife's edge where the cost of garbage collection exactly matches the marginal cost of recycling. However, the household will never choose interior solutions for two materials with different marginal cost. To see this, first remember that garbage and recycling are perfect substitutes in disposal (m j = g j + r j ) and that different materials provide equal disutility if discarded (g=? j g j ). Now suppose the household were using both garbage and recycling for two kinds of waste materials with different marginal cost of recycling. This situation cannot be an optimal solution because the household could switch one unit of the higher-recycling-cost waste from recycling to garbage, and switch one unit of the lower-recycling-cost waste from garbage to recycling, while consuming the same amount of each material, generating the same total garbage and recycling, and saving the difference in marginal cost. Such switches would continue until the household is discarding all materials that meet condition (8a) and recycling all that meet (8b).<6>
With a few simplifying assumptions, we can use Figure 1 to illustrate the disposal choices of the household. First, assume that the income effect of an increase in the user fee is zero. In other words, the reduction of income attributable to an increase in the user fee does not change total consumption. Second, we assume that all types of materials can be ranked along the horizontal axis in a descending order according to the cost of recycling (p rj). For example, toxic waste would be ranked first and precious metals last. Third, we assume the household must dispose of one unit of each type of waste material on the spectrum. Given these assumptions, the overall schedule of recycling costs can be represented by P r in Figure 1 . Again, material types are ranked from highest cost to lowest cost from left to right. Discrete materials (j = 1,...,J) would generate a step function, but we show a continuous P r schedule for ease of exposition. This schedule does not have to be linear or even differentiable, it only has to be non-increasing.
The first order conditions indicate the marginal cost to the household of recycling is equal not only to market transfer price (P r ), but the value of resources devoted to separating and storing the material (p k ) as well. The addition of this cost introduces another curve in Figure 1 higher than P r but parallel, labeled MC r . The MC r curve indicates the overall marginal cost to the household of recycling each material type across the spectrum. The overall marginal cost of placing garbage at the curb in the absence of a user fee is the value of the marginal utility lost by household, -u g*/*. We assume the value of the lost marginal utility of contributing garbage is constant across materials. This cost is represented by the horizontal line labeled MCg in Figure 1 . The height of MCg is unique to each household because each household has a different value of u g*/*. These marginal cost schedules allow us to illustrate the amounts of garbage and recycling chosen by the household.
According to (8a) and (8b), the household can be expected to remove material j using the lowest cost alternative. This choice is illustrated by finding the lower envelope of marginal waste removal costs across all materials. In the absence of a user fee for garbage collection, the quantity of garbage is determined in Figure 1 by the horizontal distance between the origin and point g (where the cost to discard garbage is less than the cost to recycle). The quantity of recycling is indicated by the horizontal distance between point m and point g. The household transfers these materials directly to secondary markets without a curbside collection program for recyclable materials. Notice that all materials along the spectrum are either recycled or discarded as garbage. The amounts of garbage and recycling by each household will depend on where that household's unique MCr curve intersects the MCg curve. Figure 1 can also be used to indicate the amount of garbage and recycling produced by a household when a user fee for garbage collection is implemented. A user fee of tg' per bag increases the overall marginal cost to the household of contributing garbage to MCg + tg'. The user fee causes the amount of garbage to decrease from g to g' and the amount of recycling to increase from (m-g) to (m-g'). The magnitudes of these changes depend on the slope of the MCr curve through point g. The flatter is MCr, the cheaper it is to recycle additional materials, and the greater the change in recycling.
The implementation of a curbside recycling program also affects the waste disposal choices of households.
Assume that the local government has agreed to collect, transport, and recycle certain materials at no cost to the household (an implicit subsidy or tax of sr j = p rj). Therefore, the marginal cost of recycling materials that are collected from the curb is only the extra time (p k ) involved with separating and storing the material. In the absence of a user fee for garbage collection (t g = 0), (8a) and (8b) suggest only households that have a strong dislike for contributing garbage (-u g*/* > pk) will participate in the curbside recycling program. All other households will not participate. Of course, all households might still recycle the more valuable materials directly to secondary markets if they receive a price such that the net cost MCr is less than the cost of any alternative (either MC g for garbage, or 0 for curbside recycling). Figure 2 illustrates the disposal choices of households when a curbside recycling program has been implemented in the community. Again, let MC r represent the schedule of marginal recycling costs and let MC g represent the value of disutility from contributing garbage. Assume that all materials ranked to the right of point a are collected by the government at no cost to the household.<7> Households must still devote time to separate and store these materials (p k ). Since this cost is assumed to be constant across all materials, the MC r curve is flat over the range of materials that are collected for recycling by the government. The materials ranked to the right of point d will be transferred directly to secondary markets since these materials have positive value.
The garbage cost function of two households in the same community, but with different preferences against contributing garbage, are labeled MC g1 and MC g2 in Figure 2 . The household with MC g2 has strong distaste for contributing garbage (MC g2 > p k ) and will participate in the curbside recycling program in the absence of a user fee for garbage collection. The marginal cost of recycling the materials ranked between a and d is less than the overall marginal cost of throwing the material away. To see this, look again for the lower envelope of marginal costs in Figure 2 . Household 2 discards all materials ranked to the left of g 2 (point a), recycles all materials ranked between g 2 and d at the curb, and sells all materials ranked to the right of d in secondary markets (where p rj <0 so they get paid for those materials).
The household facing MC g1 has a very little distaste for contributing garbage (MC g1 < p k ) and will not recycle at the curb. This household discards all materials ranked to the left of g 1 (where MC g1 is less than MC r ) and sells material ranked to the right of g 1 directly to secondary markets. In order to encourage these households to recycle at the curb, the government must implement a user fee.
If t g ' > p k -MC g1 is levied on each bag of garbage collected, the household with MC g2 will not change its disposal behavior. It will still recycle materials ranked between points a and d at the curb. However, the household represented by MC g1 is given the incentive to participate in the curbside recycling program. It discards all materials ranked to the left of point a, presents material ranked between a and d at the curb for recycling (since MC r1< MC g1 + t g ' for those materials), and sells all material ranked to the right of d in secondary markets. As indicated by equation (8b), t g must be greater than p k -MC g1 to induce these households to choose to recycle these materials ranked between a and d at the curb. Larger values of the user fee would be needed to encourage households with a lower distaste for contributing garbage to recycle at the curb.<8>
Aggregate Behavior
One point of the theory is to explain how a user fee for garbage collection affects the aggregate amounts of garbage and recycling produced by a community. These aggregate amounts are obtained by summing across the garbage and recycling quantities produced by all households in the community, for any possible value of a user fee. Aggregate curves for two different communities are illustrated in Figure 3 .
Assume, for comparison, both communities have the same amount of aggregate material to discard and do not have curbside recycling programs. Aggregate demand for recycling in community 1 is the horizontal distance from point M leftward to the curve labeled D R1, and aggregate garbage is the rest of M. In the absence of a user fee for garbage collection, households in community 1 discard G1 in a landfill and recycle M-G1. A user fee of t g ' will encourage this community to reduce its garbage to G 1 ' and increase its recycling to (M-G 1 '). These changes arise because all households in the community choose to recycle more materials once a user fee is implemented (as in Figure 1) .
The D R2 function determines the aggregate quantity of garbage and recycling produced by community 2. At any value of the user fee, this community recycles a greater quantity of material than the first community. If a user fee with value t g ' is levied, for example, community 2 discards G 2 ' and recycles (M-G 2 '). Community 2 could be comprised of more households that have strong distaste for contributing garbage.
Empirical observation indicates that some local governments have chosen to implement user fees for garbage collection while most others have not. We assume that a local government will implement a user fee if the benefits of doing so out-weigh the costs. Important benefits could be the reduction in garbage and increase in recycling that result from the user fee. Since households in this model engage in no dumping, the only cost is the value of resources used to administer the user fee program.
As drawn in Figure 3 , the change in garbage and recycling quantities resulting from the implementation of a user fee is greater for community 1 than for community 2. The town of those with a strong distaste for contributing garbage (community 2) does not necessarily experience a large increase in aggregate recycling due to a user fee. Households in community 2 may be recycling in large quantities before the user fee, leaving little room for additional recycling. Therefore the benefits of implementing a user fee may be greater for community 1 than for community 2. Ceteris paribus, we expect communities with flatter D R schedules (like D R1) to be more likely to implement a user fee since the benefits are greater..
Why is community 1 more conducive to the implementation of a user fee for garbage collection than community 2? Our model suggests that community 1 must be comprised of many households that increase their recycling amounts following the implementation of a user fee. These large increases would result if the MC r schedule in Figure 1 is relatively flat near the horizontal axis, and if many households in the community do not participate in the curbside recycling program before the user fee. A flat MC r schedule indicates that more materials can be recycled at a low additional cost to the household. In the presence of a curbside recycling program, for example, the marginal cost of recycling is flat across those materials collected at the curb. This serves to flatten the aggregate recycling schedule. Therefore, communities with curbside recycling may be more likely to implement a user fee.<9>
Suppose the value of the user fee does not affect administrative costs such as advertising the program, printing the stickers, and enforcing the law. Since the benefits of implementing the user fee program increase with the value of the user fee, and the costs do not, this simple model without a litter option suggests that governments would be likely to levy a very high user fee.<10> For example, the government in community 1 could levy a user fee with a value of t gmax and then collect no garbage. All materials would be recycled. Therefore, the model suggests that all governments would either (1) not implement a user fee, if the administrative cost is greater than the benefit of having no garbage, or (2) charge at least t gmax for each bag of garbage, if the benefits of no garbage exceed the administrative cost of the user fee program.
Casual observations in the U.S. reject this theoretical implication. Only 2000 communities across the U.S. have implemented user fees for garbage collection. Most of these fees are moderate, like $.80 per bag. One explanation for the failure of this model to explain government behavior could be that governments are concerned with the amount of illegal dumping that would arise following the implementation of a user fee. A more appropriate model would include illegal dumping as a third removal option for households. We now proceed to develop such a model.
THE MODEL WITH A LITTERING OPTION
Several recent models of household solid waste behavior have considered the littering option. Kennedy and Laplante (1994) solve for the optimal user fee given the option to litter, but do not consider materials with different recycling costs. Fullerton and Kinnaman (forthcoming) argue that the possibility of illegal dumping implies that the optimal user fee for garbage collection could be zero. Sullivan (1987) and Dobbs (1991) also allow for litter in their models. We improve on these models by allowing heterogeneous households to choose among three removal methods for diverse types of goods.
Individual Behavior
Assume that households have the option to burn, dump, or litter garbage:
(9)mj = gj + rj + bj where bj is the amount of burning of material j conducted by the household. Also, assume that all households dislike the act of burning or littering garbage:
where b = ?jbj, ub<0, and all other variables are defined as above.
No market or price exists for the littering or burning of garbage, but we assume that the household must pay a fixed cost f if it engages in such practice. This fixed cost could include, for example, the cost of finding a suitable dump site, the fixed portion of the cost of traveling to the dumpsite, the psychic cost of breaking a local ordinance, and the risk of a fine. In other words, dumping two bags is not twice as costly as dumping one bag, in terms of transport cost, the risk of getting caught, and feeling bad about this antisocial behavior. Later we address the possibility that fixed costs arise in recycling.
The new budget constraint facing the household is:
? j p cjcj + t g g + ? j (p rj-s rj)rj + f = p k (k-r). if b>0. The household maximizes utility (10) subject to (1), (9), and the budget constraint (11) by choosing the amounts of consumption, garbage, recycling, and litter. First order conditions for disposal are: where is still the marginal utility of income to the household. Again, these results imply a set of corner solutions if the values of the right-hand sides of (13) are not equal to each other. If the household engages in no littering (b=0) then household behavior is described by (8a) and (8b). With some illegal dumping (b>0), choice on the margin over methods of removing the waste material of type j is determined by: where * and u *g are the values of and ug evaluated at the maximum. The household will again choose to remove material j using the lowest cost alternative (where the "cost" of contributing garbage includes effects on utility and the user fee). For most materials, households are again predicted to use only one method of removal.
With No Curbside Recycling
When will a household pay the fixed cost associated with littering garbage? In the absence of a curbside recycling program, the answer depends on the value of the user fee and the schedule of recycling costs. With a few simplifying assumptions, we can use Figure 4a to illustrate the conditions that create the incentive for a household to pay the fixed costs (f) and litter garbage. First, assume that the value of disutility associated with contributing garbage is equal to the value of disutility of burning or dumping garbage illegally (ug=ub). This assumption simplifies the graphical exposition while changing few of the conclusions of the model (see Footnote 10). Second, assume that the income effect of an increase in the user fee is zero. In other words, the reduction of income attributable to an increase in the user fee does not change total consumption. Furthermore, assume that we can once again order materials according to the marginal cost of recycling (MC r ), which includes the cost of household time spent separating and storing material and the market price for the transfer of the material. The marginal cost of functions associated with recycling (MC r ), and with contributing or illegally dumping garbage (MC g =MC b ) are illustrated in Figure 4a . The fixed costs associated with dumping introduces an average cost curve, which is also included in Figure 4a , and labeled AC b .
According to (13a), (13b), and (13c), and as illustrated in Figure 4a , the household will discard all materials ranked to the left of g o , will litter nothing, and will supply the remaining materials (m-g o ) directly to secondary markets in the absence of a user fee for garbage collection. These results are again determined by looking for the lower envelope of disposal costs. Notice again that the removal of all materials is accounted for.
A user fee for garbage collection will change the households disposal choices because it increases the marginal cost of contributing garbage to the curb. Small increases in the user fee (not shown in Figure 4a ) will increase the number of materials that are recycled and decrease the number of materials that are placed at the curb as garbage. These small increases do not provide the incentive to pay the fixed costs associated with illegally dumping garbage. However, a user fee of t g' increases the overall marginal cost of contributing garbage to t g ' + MC g ) makes the household indifferent between paying the fee for garbage vs. paying the fixed costs f and then dumping waste illegally. More specifically, a user fee of t g ' makes the household indifferent between (1) putting into garbage all materials ranked to the left of g t and supplying all other materials to secondary markets, and (2) dumping all materials ranked to the left of g o and supplying the remaining materials to secondary markets. The threshold value of the user fee (t g ') is found where the total cost of option (1), denoted by the trapezoidal area a,b,e,0 in Figure 4a (the cost of discarding g t plus the cost of recycling), is equal to the total cost of option (2), which is AC bf,c,d,e,0 (the cost of burning or dumping go plus recycling costs). The household would choose the second option for any user fee with value greater than t g .
The information contained in Figure 4a can be captured in a another manner using Figures 4b, 4c , and 4d. Figure 4b maps the demand curve for garbage as a function of the user fee. As stated above, the household decreases its quantity demanded for garbage collection (and increases recycling) as the price of garbage increases to t g '. Once the price of garbage exceeds this threshold value, the quantity demanded for garbage collection falls to zero. Figure 4c maps the cross-price relationship between the price of garbage and the quantity of recycling. Household recycling increases with larger values of the user fee over the interval between zero and t g '. At this point, recycling decreases as the household begins to litter garbage. Household recycling efforts are unresponsive to all values of the user fee that are greater than t g '. Figure 4d illustrates the effect of the user fee on the quantity of burning or dumping litter. No littering is conducted below the threshold value of the user fee, but the household litters g o for all values of the user fee that are greater than t g '. Once the fixed costs of littering are paid, the marginal cost of littering items ranked from g o leftward is less than the marginal cost of recycling them.
Several points arise from this simple model. First, the household would never simultaneously engage in positive quantities of littering b and discarding garbage g. The household uses only garbage and recycling at low values of the user fee, and only uses dumping and recycling at high values. Second, the household will never recycle more than (m-g t ) for any value of the user fee. Therefore, a very high user fee may not be optimal. In fact, free garbage collection may be optimal if (1) the administrative cost of operating a user fee program is high, and (2) t g is relatively low.
Recall that -u g*/* is the marginal "cost" of contributing garbage. The values of g o , g t , and t g ' in Figure 4a are determined, in part, by the value of -u g*/* and are, therefore, unique to each household. The values of g o and g t decrease as the value of -u g*/* increases. Households with a strong distaste for contributing garbage will recycle more, discard less, and litter less than households with less of a distaste. The threshold value of the user fee (tg') increases as -u g*/* increases. Therefore, households that have a strong distaste for contributing garbage (and littering) wait for a higher value of the user fee before they are induced to litter their garbage. An increase in -u g*/* will also serve to shift the curves in Figure 4b and 4d to the left and shift the curve in Figure 4c to the right, while again, raising the threshold value of the user fee.
With Free Recycling at the Curb
How will the implementation of a curbside recycling program influence household response to a user fee for garbage collection? A household will respond to a user fee in one of three ways, according to its value of -u g*/ * relative to pk. The first category of households will never recycle at the curb, regardless of the value of the user fee. The second category of households will recycle at the curb for a certain range of user fee, but will not recycle for values outside this range. The third category of households will still recycle at the curb even when it engages in littering. The households in higher numbered categories hold a greater distaste for contributing garbage (-u g*/*) relative to the opportunity cost of recycling (pk).
The first category of households have the lowest distaste for contributing garbage, its choice among disposal methods is illustrated in Figure 5a . The overall marginal cost of presenting garbage, denoted by MCg in Figure 5a , is very low relative to pk. These households either do not care too much about their garbage contributions or find the opportunity cost of recycling to be too high. Assume that the city is willing to collect materials ranked between point a and point m in Figure 5a , at no monetary cost to the household. In the absence of a user fee, the household discards g o at no monetary cost and sends (m-g o ) to a secondary markets. This household will sell more material in secondary markets as the value of the user fee increases from zero, but will still not participate in a curbside recycling program. To try to induce these households to participate in the curbside recycling program, a user fee would have to be implemented with a value greater than p k -MC g . However, any value of the user fee which is greater than t g ' would cause this household to pay the fixed costs and litter all materials ranked to the left of g o (as explained above). Since p k >t g '+MC g , this household will never recycle at the curb. Most communities have households that fit in this category. No community has experienced 100% participation rates in its curbside recycling program, even those with substantial user fees.
Figures 5b, 5c, and 5d summarize the relationships between the value of the user fee and the quantities of garbage (g), recycling (r), and burning (b). A small user fee will induce this kind of household to sell more materials in secondary markets, but any user fee greater than t g ' will induce this household to litter.
The second category of households have a greater distaste for contributing garbage than the first category, however, the marginal cost of recycling material (p k ) is still greater than the overall marginal "cost" of contributing garbage to the curb. This household will recycle at the curb, but only in response to very specific values of the user fee. The household will discard these materials if the user fee is too low or litter them if the user fee is too high. Figure 6a illustrates the behavior of this category of households. In the absence of a user fee, this category will put into garbage all materials ranked to the left of g o and will sell the remaining materials in secondary markets. As the value of the user fee increases from zero, the household will gradually discard less material and recycle more. It will recycle at the curb for values of the user fee slightly greater than p k . If a user fee of t g ' is implemented, the household is indifferent between (1) discarding all materials ranked to the left of g t and of g o and sending (m-g o ) to secondary markets. The total cost of method 1 is the area (f,a,h,c,e,0) , while that of method 2 is (AC bf, b, d, e, 0) . The threshold value of the user fee (t g ') is found where these two areas are equal. The household chooses to litter g o for all values of t g ' greater than the threshold value.
These results are also summarized in Figures 6b, 6c , and 6d, where quantities of garbage, recycling, and litter are mapped over all positive values of the user fee. Figure 6b shows that, as the value of the user fee increases from zero, households in this category gradually reduce the quantity of garbage. As the user fee increases above p k -MC g , the household sharply reduces its garbage and begins to recycle at the curb. Once the user fee rises above t g ', the household stops discarding garbage, and, as Figure 6d illustrates, begins to litter. This response of recycling to a user fee is somewhat surprising. The household participates in curbside recycling for values of the user fee slightly greater than p k -MC g , but it abandons its curbside recycling efforts once the user fee exceeds t g '. At this high fee, the household has the incentive to pay the fixed cost f associated with dumping. Since the marginal cost of dumping materials (MC b ) is lower than the overall marginal "cost" of recycling them at the curb (p k ), the household will litter these recyclable materials as well.
Households in category 3 will recycle at the curb even in the absence of a user fee. The marginal cost to recycle materials collected at the curb (p k ) is less than the marginal "cost" of discarding garbage in the absence of a user fee MC g . The logic can be seen in Figure 7a . The household discards all materials to the left of g o and participates in curbside recycling in the absence of a user fee. Therefore, the implementation of a user fee for garbage collection will have no impact on this household's curbside recycling level. However, if the value of the user fee exceeds t g , the household begins to litter all material ranked to the left of g o (at marginal cost MC b ) and recycle the rest.<11>
Figures 7b, 7c, and 7d summarize these results. Notice in Figure 7c that the amount of recycling conducted by these households is fairly unresponsive to price. In fact, the only major change in waste removal methods attributed to a change in the user fee is a switch from discarding garbage (g) to burning or littering (b). This switch occurs for values of the user fee greater than t g '. This result suggests that garbage fees would have little success in increasing the recycling levels of households who have rather strong preferences for recycling. These households already participate in the curbside recycling program in the absence of a user fee, leaving little room to increase their recycling quantities following the implementation of the user fee.<12>
Aggregate Behavior
The community's demand schedule for garbage collection can be derived by adding the amounts of garbage thrown out by all households in the community, at each value of the user fee. Individual garbage quantities with curbside recycling are depicted in Figures 5b through 7b , where all types of households either reduce or leave unchanged their garbage quantities with increases in the value of the user fee. A higher user fee never increases the quantity of garbage. Therefore, aggregate garbage never increases with the user fee.
Similarly, Figures (5d) through (7d) illustrate that increasing values of the user fee either increase or leave unchanged amounts of litter for all households. Therefore, the aggregation of household litter must either increase or remain unchanged with higher values of the user fee. Aggregate litter will never decrease.
The same story cannot be told for aggregate recycling levels. One might expect that aggregate recycling would increase with higher values of the user fee, and this result certainly holds for some households over some ranges of the user fee. However, Figures (5c) through (7c) indicate that households can reduce recycling over some range of the user fee. Different households will decrease recycling by different amounts, and over different ranges of t g . Therefore, the horizontal aggregation of recycling across all households could either rise or fall with increasing values of the user fee.
The logic is a bit different for each category of households, but increases in tg' will eventually induce all households to pay the fixed cost and begin to litter waste material. Once these fixed costs are paid, the household may find the marginal cost of dumping (MC b ) to be less than the marginal cost of recycling (MC r ). At this point, a higher value of t g ' induces less recycling.
The relationships between the user fee and these aggregate amounts are illustrated in Figure 8 for two specific communities. The aggregate recycling function for community 1 (call it D R1) is drawn so that aggregate recycling (measured from the point M leftward) rises with the user fee. The litter function for community 1 (call it D B1) reflects the fact that some households, perhaps in category 1, litter garbage even at very low values of the user fee. As the user fee increases from zero, more households are predicted to pay the fixed cost associated with littering and contribute to aggregate litter.
If no user fee is charged for garbage, the community with recycling function D R1 and littering function D B1 litters an amount B1 = 0, recycles M-G1, and discards G1. As long as the marginal cost of littering is positive and the marginal cost to discard garbage is zero, then all communities experience no litter in the absence of a user fee. Once a user fee of t g ' is levied, the amount of litter increases to B 1 ', the amount of recycling increases to M-G 1 ', and the amount of garbage decreases to G 1 '-B 1 '.
These functions for a second community are denoted by D R2 and D B2. With user fee t g ', community 2 increases litter from B 2 to B 2 1, increases recycling from M-G 2 to M-G 2 ' and reduces the level of garbage from G 2 -B 2 to G 2 '-B 2 '. Notice that the increase in litter is smaller than experienced by community 1. As drawn, the change in recycling for community 2 is larger than for community 1. Therefore, community 2 may realize greater benefits and lower costs from the implementation of a user fee.<13>
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This paper has contributed to the literature on user fees for garbage collection in several ways. We introduced heterogeneity into a model of household choice over garbage removal methods. This model explained (1) why some households participate in curbside recycling programs in the absence of a user fee, (2) why other households do not recycle at the curb even in the presence of a user fee, and (3) why some households choose to litter garbage when others do not. We aggregated diverse households in each community to provide a prediction that a user fee will never increase garbage, and will never decrease illicit burning or dumping. At some point, however, the garbage fee becomes high enough to induce some people to pay the fixed cost of dumping and thus to switch away from recycling. As a consequence, the garbage fee might decrease aggregate recycling.
The model is general enough to encompass fixed costs for recycling instead of for dumping. Individuals and recycling firms may incur search and transport costs that do not vary with the amount recycled. If so, the same model could be employed to show that a rising garbage fee would generate monotonic decreases in garbage and monotonic increases in recycling. At some point, however, the garbage fee would become high enough to induce some people to pay the fixed cost of recycling and thus to switch away from dumping. As a consequence, the garbage fee might decrease aggregate dumping.
We found that the observed low or moderate garbage fees cannot be explained in a model where households cannot burn, dump, or litter. Therefore, we added this option to the model. We described three categories of households, and we aggregated individual behavior to find community demands. We found that individual behavior, and thus aggregate demands, depend upon (1) the community's distribution of household preferences for contributing garbage, (2) the fixed costs associated with dumping, (3) the price of recyclable materials, and (4) the presence of curbside recycling. Therefore, empirical work will require measures of those variables.
The theory also makes some specific predictions that can be tested empirically. In general, the own-price elasticity for garbage should be non-positive. The cross-price effect of the garbage fee on recycling quantities could be negative or positive at high values of the garbage fee (where it could induce people to pay the fixed cost of dumping and thus to switch out of recycling), but it should be non-negative at low values of the user fee.
We thought about how these aggregate outcomes affect the costs and benefits to a community from the implementation of a user fee program. In particular, the heterogeneity of households implies that some communities will respond more than others. Thus a user fee is more likely to be adopted in communities with low administrative costs, large increases in recycling, and small increases in dumping. The important implication for empirical work is that the town's choice of user fee is not exogenous.
